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RECENT DECISIONS
cars, and to help defray the cost of installation and supervision, may be used.
Since such things as telephone posts and telegraph poles were permitted, parking
meters should also be permitted, since they facilitate the use of public ways for
purposes of transportation or passage, and promote the safety and comfort of
those who travel. In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass. 1937) 8 N.E. (2d) 179.
In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271
U.S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct 605, 70 L.ed. 1101 (1926) Mr. Justice McReynolds in a concurring opinion expressed the general idea of liberality that the courts should
take in construing regulations concerning transportation on public highways as
follows: "The states are now struggling with new and enormously difficult
problems incident to the growth of automotive traffic, and we should carefully
refrain from interference unless and until there is some real, direct, and material
infraction of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."
EDwARD F. ZAPPEN.

Municipal Corporations-Schools and School Districts--Mandamus-When
"May" Means "Must"--Mandamus to compel defendant, a common school
district, to furnish free transportation to and from school to an eight year old
boy living about four and a half miles from school. The Statute provided
that a school board "may" provide for the free transportation of pupils
to and from school at the expense of the school district, provided funds
for such purposes are available. Defendant denied plaintiff's request. Plaintiff contended that the statute imposed a duty to furnish the transportation. The trial 'court quashed the alternative writ and plaintiffs appealed. On
appeal, held, judgment affirmed. The statute merely authorized the school board
to act. Mandamus will not be granted to control discretion by directing its
exercise in a particular way. State ex rel. Klimek v. School Dist. No. 70, Otter
Tail County (Minn. 1939) 283 N.W. 397.
When administrative officers refuse to perform a mere ministerial duty imposed upon them by law, mandamus may issue to compel them to perform such
duty; but, when such official act requires the exercise of judgment or discretion mandamus will not be granted. State ex rel. Gericke v. The Mayor and
Comnon Council of Ahnapee, 99 Wis. 322, 74 N.W. 783 (1898); State ex rel.
Drew v. Shaughnessy, 212 Wis. 322, 249 N.W. 522 (1933); State ex rel. Atty.
Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892); United States ex rel.
Baynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 11 Sup. Ct.607, 35 L.ed. 183 (1891). However,
an officer may be required by mandamus to exercise his discretion in one way
or the other. Browning v. Daw, 60 Cal. App. 680, 213 Pac. 707 (1923) ; People v.
Russell, 294 Ill. 283, 128 N.E. 495 (1926) ; Beem v. Davis, 31 Idaho 730, 175 Pac.
959 (1918).
The word "may," according to its ordinary construction, is permissive, and
should receive that interpretation, unless such construction would be obviously
repugnant to the intention of the Legislature, or would lead to some other inconvenience or absurdity. Medbury v. Swan, 46 N.Y. 200 (1871) ; Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. City of Oshkosh, 140 Wis. 58, 121 N.W. 603 (1909). Whether the
word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty,
or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each
case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context.
Colby University v. Village of Cavandaigna, 69 Fed. 671 (1895); Kentble v.
McPhaill, 128 Cal. 444, 60 Pac. 1092 (1900); People ex rel. Chiperfield v. Sani-
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tary Dist. of Chicago, 184 Ill. 597, 56 N.E. 953 (1900). Authority given in permissive language must be exercised where other persons have an absolute
right to, have it exercised. Kelley v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83 (1864).
There is a division of authority as to the interpretation of "may" in statutes
like that involved in the principal case. A New York statute authorizing inhabitants of a school district to provide for transportation of pupils, and providing that the trustees "may" contract for their conveyance, was held to be
permissive and not mandatory. In Re Board of Education of Union Free School
Dist. No. 2 of Town of Brookhaven, Suffolk County, 210 N.Y. Supp. 439 (1925).
However, under a similar statute in South Dakota the court held "may" to
mean "must" because public interest and individual rights call for the exercise
of powers given. Swenehart v. Strathman, 12 S.D. 313, 81 N.W. 505 (1900);
State ex rel. Coolsaet v. City of Veblen, 58 S.D. 451, 237 N.W. 555 (1931).
Under an Illinois statute "may" was similarly construed. People ex rel. Brokaw
v. Commissioners of Highways, 130 111.
482, 22 N.E. 596 (1889).
The Wisconsin statute authorizing the transportation of children to and
from school, Wis. STAT. (1937) § 40.34, uses "may" when referring to the
authority of the school district meeting, and "shall" when referring to the
authority of the school board. The Attorney-General has indicated that under
this statute mandamus will not lie to compel a school district to provide transportation for children living more than two and a half miles from school, on
the ground that the statute makes adequate provision for their transportation
when the district fails to provide it. 24 Atty. Gen. 652. The statute provides for
the compensation of parents who furnish transportation for their children if
the school district fails to transport them.
WILIAm I

CuxRaR.

Workmen's Compensation Acts-Meaning of "Accident."-Plaintiff alleged
that he suffered an accident in the course of his employment. He had been employed by the defendant for more than a year at a machine that made building
blocks composed of sand, ashes and cement. Sand and ashes often collected in
the plaintiff's shoes. He claimed to have a small dark-pigmented mole above
his little toe and that the sand and ashes entered this mole and caused an irritation which produced a melanoma. He underwent several operations, but he
was denied compensation by the Workmen's Compensation bureau, which found
that the condition was purely occupational and was not the result of an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment. On appeal, held, judgment
affirmed. Where no specific time can be fixed as the time when an accident
occurred, there is no accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Ballinger v. Wagaraw Bldg. Supply Co. (New Jersey, 1938) 200 Atl.
744.
The instant case is an illustration of the majority rule on the meaning of
the term "accident." Where no specific time or occasion can be fixed as the time
of the alleged accident there can be no "injury by accident" within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Szalkowski v. C. S. Osborne & Co., 9 N.J. Mis. 538,
154 Atl. 611 (1931). An occurrence to constitute an "accident!' within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be traceable to a definite time,
place, and cause and must have been unexpected. Prouse v. The Industrial Cornmission of Colorado, 69 Colo. 382, 29 P. (2d) 625 (1921). Where incapacity results from the natural and gradual wearing away of physical capacity or con-

